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SECURITISING CITIZENSHIP:  
(B)ordering practices and strategies of resistance 
ABSTRACT 
This article builds upon Yasemin Soysal’s early work on postnational citizenship as constituting 
sites of resistance in contemporary European politics. Postnational citizenship provides every 
person with the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a 
polity, regardless of their historical ties to that community. This celebration of human rights as a 
world-level organising principle is, however, constantly challenged by liberal discourses and 
practices aimed to securitise identities and citizenships through the bordering of space, place and 
identities. Proceeding from a critical take on securitisation we propose that in addition to a focus 
on the exceptional and on elite speech acts, we need to recognize that it is through everyday 
practices that people engage in (de)securitising strategies and practices that both rely upon and 
contest notions of belonging and borders. We exemplify by looking at two (diverse) minority 
communities in Britain and Canada that have been securitised at transnational, national and local 
levels, and study the extent to which we can see evidence of everyday resistance through the 
explicit or implicit use of desecuritising strategies. In both settings, the communities we study 
are young Muslims. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article builds upon Yasemin Soysal’s1 early work on postnational citizenship as constituting 
sites of resistance in contemporary European politics. Postnational citizenship provides every 
person with the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a 
polity, regardless of their historical ties to that community. This celebration of human rights as a 
world-level organizing principle is, however, constantly challenged by liberal discourses and 
practices aimed to securitise identities and citizenships through the bordering of space, place and 
identities. Proceeding from a critical take on securitisation we propose that in addition to a focus 
on the exceptional and on elite speech acts, we need to recognize that it is through everyday 
practices that people engage in (de)securitising strategies and practices that both rely upon and 
contest notions of belonging and borders. To what extent are those at the margins of citizenship 
able to resist securitising practices aimed at limiting their presence and rights and how do these 
actors reproduce securitising practices that distinguish them from other groups? How can such 
claims be understood in terms of desecuritisation processes and what are the socio-psychological 
dynamics behind such resisting practices?  
Building upon our previous work, we exemplify by looking at two (diverse) minority 
communities in Britain and Canada that have been securitised at transnational, national and local 
levels, and study the extent to which we can see evidence of everyday resistance through the 
explicit or implicit use of desecuritising strategies. In both settings, the communities we study 
are young Muslims. These communities have been chosen in order to outline different kinds of 
securitising practices affecting people who, while sharing a common ethno-religious 
characteristic are situated in countries with distinctive histories of immigration and citizenship 
regimes. As we shall see, despite the distinctive character of the Canadian regime, notably its 
policy of multiculturalism and its political culture of polyethnic diversity, the range of 
(de)securitising citizenship strategies finds patterns of both commonality and distinctiveness 
between the two national settings. In both the Canadian and the British settings, we are 
concerned with the narratives surrounding these communities and the particular forms of 
governance structures affecting their ability to act as citizens as well as the bordering practices 
they engage in. The empirical study is based on our interviews, reports and media transcripts2. 
The aim is not to provide a full-fledged analysis of all aspects of citizenship and the specific 
opportunities and hindrances affecting these groups, but rather to provide an illustrative study of 
the relationship between governance, narratives, borders and (de)securitisation to show the 
increasing difficulties postnational citizenship is facing in a global context. 
We start by outlining the connection between citizenship and sovereignty. Here we 
delineate the theoretical debates surrounding these issues with a particular emphasis on the crisis 
of postnational citizenship in a world governed by security. Empirically the focus is on how the 
current world order can be interpreted in terms of exceptional politics and how this exerts an 
impact on the governance of subjectivities and behaviour. We argue that such practices exist 
within re-invented master narratives that aim to reify borders, manifest in clear boundaries which 
act as co-constructors of individuals’ and groups’ self-identity in relation to significant others. 
Second, we proceed to a discussion of how this process involves securitising moves in relation to 
sovereign bodies, moves that are related to the naturalisation of borders and the narrativisation 
of boundaries. This involves a critical reading of much current security literature in an effort to 
clarify how securitisation must be viewed in co-constitutive terms in which individual agency 
and the narrative construction of boundaries play an important part. Third, we discuss how 
bringing individuals and emotions into the picture can help us in conceptualising a politics of 
resistance and desecuritisation. Relying on Bakhtin’s and Markova’s concept of dialogism and 
Agamben’s discussion of subjectification and resistance we sketch a possible politics of 
resistance in response to the governing of subjectivity and the regulation of behaviour through 
narrative means. Finally, we provide empirical examples of both securitising and desecuritising 
practices by relating the theoretical discussion to our study of young Muslims in Britain and 
Canada. We conclude by drawing some general inferences from this illustrative study. 
CITIZENSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY  
Events occurring at a global level have local repercussions, not least in terms of how citizenship 
is conceptualised and sometimes changed. Traditionally citizenship has been used to differentiate 
between citizens and non-citizens, where citizenship is attached to people because of their 
belonging to a state jurisdiction. This implies that rights are principally connected to citizenship, 
rather than being universally defined and enforced3. International legal human rights structures 
are of course built upon universal rights of people, but as Covenants they are ascribed to and 
enforced through an international state system which tends to exclude those considered non-
citizens from the discourse4. Moreover, international agreements are weak and lacking in clear 
enforcement mechanisms under international law. From this perspective, citizenship is 
predominantly connected to borders as the modern state claims monopoly over the legitimate 
crossing of borders. Hence any border-related conception of citizen is framed within a 
perspective of sovereignty in which the state has the right to decide who its citizens are (or not), 
thus providing or denying entry of persons on the basis of citizenship 5.  
Critical attempts to overcome this conflation of rights have been suggested by scholars 
writing about cosmopolitan citizenship as well as multicultural citizenship. Both are concerned 
with the idea of the territorial state as the basis for rights. The cosmopolitan version is focused on 
how people are members of both bounded communities and a universal community of human 
kind, so called world citizens – a notion that is tied to ideas about certain universal moral rights 
of all individuals6. Cosmopolitan citizenship has been criticized for ignoring the fact that such 
moral conceptions rely on particularistic ideas of rights originating in Western liberal democracy 
with the emphasis on individual rather than group rights7. Theories of multicultural citizenship 
have challenged the cosmopolitan rights-based doctrine and have been concerned to move away 
from the idea of individual rights. By taking into account not only universal sameness in terms of 
inalienable individual rights, multicultural citizenship theories have addressed issues of group 
rights in general and minority rights in particular.8 In Kymlicka’s9 reading this is mainly related 
to the national state in terms of providing particular rights to various groups in a society based on 
issues of inequality. More critical versions of multicultural citizenship emphasize not only class 
and inequality, but also questions of membership posed by feminism, race and ethnic 
movements, ecology and vulnerable minorities10. Here the emphasis is on non-essentialist 
readings of culture, nations and peoples and the attempt is often to decouple citizenship from 
nationality. 
This decoupling of citizenship from nationality has, in empirical terms, been related to 
increased globalisation and the emergence of a postnational citizenship11. Yasemin Soysal’s 
thesis from the early 1990s on the banalisation of citizenship belongs to this category as she 
discusses how transnational opportunities make national citizenship less important. When 
Pakistani immigrants in Britain make demands for the teaching of Islam in state schools for 
example, they mobilise around a Muslim identity, but they also appeal to a universalistic 
discourse of ‘human rights’ to justify their claims and pressure national governments by taking 
their case to the European Court of Human Rights12. This example, Soysal notes, tends to 
undermine predominant models of citizenship, which are normatively predicated upon the 
integrity of national communities and their boundaries. They also call into question analytic 
distinctions between states and the international system. In addition, postnational citizenship can 
be found in the ability of the individual to mobilise the international commitments of the state 
against state officials seeking to expel particular individuals. Here the international commitments 
of the liberal democratic state may bring the authority of the supranational organization to aid the 
immigrant against the state13. 
Soysal’s notion of postnational citizenship relies on the fact that nationality is no longer a 
precondition for the enjoyment of rights and is therefore seen as less important by individual 
immigrants. This banalisation of citizenship was associated with two distinct developments in 
the 1980s and 1990s, that of a move towards conditional jus soli, dual nationality, shorter waiting 
periods and less administrative discretion followed by recognition that citizenship should be 
more accessible and less tied to ethno-national membership or loyalty. The other had to do with 
the lesser difference citizenship made to the guest workers of the 1980s as they largely enjoyed 
the same social rights as majority community members14. As Mouritsen argues, however, this 
may no longer be the case. “In essence, the post-national ease of access, lack of differences 
between permanent residence and naturalization, and lack of pathos from states and individuals 
alike all comes down to the fact that the only remaining prize of ‘thin’ neo-liberal membership is 
the right to access national labour markets”15.  
 Such developments have prompted the argument that a post-9/11 world defined by 
security and terror discourses is characterised by a recoupling, rather than a decoupling, of 
citizenship and nationality
16
. In these readings the national is repeatedly inserted in terms of 
adherence to liberal values and ideas, such as reason, rationality and secularism, as a substantial 
way of life to recreate inclusion into and exclusion from the national body. This, Joppke
17
 
argues, is especially the case in Europe as many European states have reacted against politicised 
Islam. As Scuzzarello
18
 notes, certain scholars are increasingly joining popular moves to promote 
individual rather than group rights
19
. In the face of a number of real or constructed events, such 
as the Mohammed cartoon crisis, honour killings, female circumcision, the building of minarets, 
arranged marriages and other contested practices, the demand is for more liberal individualism 
rather than less. Within recent years, leaders in Germany, France and Britain – Merkel, Sarkozy 
and Cameron – have all declared an end to multiculturalism with Merkel arguing that “it had 
failed, utterly failed”, and Cameron insisting that we need more, not less “muscular liberalism” 
to confront Islamic extremism
20
. This “failure of multiculturalism narrative” in Europe has been 
reinforced through global narratives of terror and Islamophobia and has gained further strength 
through much local media. On a policy level, several countries, including Britain, Sweden and 
the Netherlands have introduced citizenship rituals, designed to ensure the conformity of new 
immigrants to the core principles of liberal democracy. Other countries, notably Denmark and 
the UK, have made naturalisation contingent on passing language and culture tests
21
. New 
restrictions of citizenship acquisition have also been tied to employment in many European 
countries, and permanent residency is increasingly conditioned on self-support and participation 
in the workforce. In Denmark, Germany and the UK, for instance, so called good citizenship now 
consists of the introduction of language requirements, knowledge tests and screening for self-
support, a clean criminal record and non-radical leanings
22
. This, we argue, signifies a deeply 
problematic political development that is itself tied to reconstructed conceptions of European 
space and sovereignty.  
Multiculturalism in Canada, however, continues to be celebrated as a vehicle to facilitate 
cultural development in the context of a coherent, co-operative and communicative political 
society, one in which there are layered patterns of interchange. Reflecting both the broad 
political culture and public policy, the dominant pattern of response among our Canadian 
interviewees is a generalised and enthusiastic acceptance of the strengths of multiculturalism as a 
policy that facilitates the retention of ethno-cultural particularisms to the extent that people 
demand such distinctiveness, within the broader unity of a shared political society. However, not 
all Canadian Muslims are entirely satisfied and even those who are supportive nonetheless 
exhibit certain reservations regarding their sense of belonging. Over the past ten to fifteen years, 
the global shifts presented above in the European setting, punctuated in Canada by the more 
proximate events of September 11 2001, have led to the intensification of securitisation both in 
the Canadian political culture and in the Canadian citizenship regime. This has resulted in echoes 
of the bordering practices identified in the European context. Confounding immigrants with 
refugees, the newcomer to Canada has been stigmatised as a dangerous outsider and as a security 
hazard
23
. Muslim and other non-white Canadian minorities with dual citizenship have been 
characterised as citizens of convenience who contribute very little to Canada and make 
unreasonable claims
24
. The Canada-US border has been securitised and Canada’s immigration 
regime has seen the relocation of sites of surveillance and control to a range of extra-territorial 
settings
25
. The embodiment of such shifts in Canada’s citizenship regime has been experienced 
through new biometric surveillance techniques
26
. The recently-elected majority Conservative 
government has accelerated the process of securitisation of the Canadian borders. Of significance 
is how the long-standing selective character of Canada’s immigration policy has been 
accentuated with a consequent latent re-racialisation of immigration. Family-class reunions have 
been de-emphasised at the expense of employment-class immigration of affluent and/or highly-
skilled immigrants. Recent controversies have arisen over the redrafting of citizenship guides to 
what critics regard as Anglo-centric and militarised standards, feeding negative stereotypes about 
new immigrants and those citizens who “look like them”. Full face veils have been banned from 
citizenship ceremonies, even though only a tiny minority of Muslim women chooses to wear 
them and even though Muslim associations agreed to accommodations. Newly emerging refugee 
policy threatens to lock refugees who arrive by sea in detention camps for up to a year without 
due process. Critics argue that the proposed legislation counters both Canadian and international 
law
27
.  
 During the 19th century, as discussed above, the modern notion of sovereignty as the 
ultimate and transcendent mark of indivisible power became increasingly synonymous with 
national sovereignty with people produced as citizens of the nation-state. In Giorgio 
Agamben’s28 terminology, the most elementary operation of sovereign power can be found in 
attempts to classify someone as being beyond dignity and full humanity or through the expulsion 
of someone who used to have rights as a citizen. Such people are not even subjects of a 
benevolent power but symbolise only mute and bare life (or Homo Sacer)29. This, what 
Agamben refers to as an inclusive exclusion, is fundamental to his thought and central to his 
account of the Western paradigm of sovereignty. Bare life is something that is produced by 
sovereign power for sovereign power. To Agamben, the state of exception in terms of the 
sovereign deciding on the exclusion of bare life has remained constitutive of the political 
community, acquiring ever more force as societies are becoming increasingly diverse; as the 
multitude of individuals are incorporated into the political community30. Security becomes a 
necessary step in preserving freedom and is used to legitimate this state of exception as a space 
in which subjects are governed and behaviour is regulated. Claudia Aradau clearly illustrates this 
in her citation of a speech by Tony Blair in 2006: 
When crimes go unpunished, that is a breach of the victim’s liberty and human rights. 
When organized crime gangs are free to practice their evil, countless young people have 
their liberty and often their lives damaged. When ASB goes unchecked, each and every 
member of the community in which it happens, has their human rights broken. When we 
can’t deport foreign nationals even when inciting violence the country is at risk31. 
Instructively, Didier Bigo has described this process as a shift in governmentality – a shift 
from the panoptical to the banoptical – in which the banopticon is defined as a regime of 
practices where specific groups are blamed already before they have done anything, “simply by 
categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends, and projecting them by 
generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual pertaining to the risk category”32. 
This form of governmentality of unease, or Ban, is the work of biometric borders that redefine 
external and internal security. It relies on exceptionalism, acts of profiling and containing 
foreigners, and a normative imperative of mobility33. Such practices exist within re-invented 
master narratives that aim to reify an object that is in fact plurilocal and manifest it in clear 
boundaries. They are mutually related and form political identities and act as co-constructors of 
individuals’ and groups’ self-identity in relation to significant others.  
NARRATIVES, BORDERS AND SECURITY 
Foucault argued for a form of critical social analysis focused on events, moments when an 
existing regime of practices is “reinvested, co-opted and redeployed by new social forces and 
governmental rationalities”34. In accordance with such rationalities, Louise Amoore states that 
“immigration and the terrorist threat became combined as a problem ‘not because there is a 
threat to the survival of society’ but because ‘scenes from everyday lives are politicized, because 
day-to-day living is securitized’”35. This securitisation of day-to-day lives is likely to focus on 
restoring a sense of community, security and order36, but in so doing the very exclusions and 
prejudices that initiate conflict are often reconstituted. This can be seen in the development of a 
European visa system which increasingly replaces the national passport as a token of trust and as 
an original source of inclusion and exclusion37. It can be further seen in recent changes to border 
security and immigration law and regulations in Canada38. In line with van Munster, this could 
imply a reinterpretation of Agamben’s state of exception to describe the dominant paradigm, or 
narrative, of governing modern societies. “In this view the state of exception is not so much a 
temporary, exceptional measure but a technique of government that relies on security”39.  
Such securitising moves involve narratives that inscribe a hegemonic set of cultural values 
upon territories and populations in order to control, know and domesticate certain groups of 
people residing in national space, even in cases when these individuals have formal citizenship 
rights. Young urban post-diasporic (second and subsequent generations) Muslim men are being 
particularly framed as security threats in such stories40. In some cases they may even emerge as 
the bare life – “the in-between forms of life, uncoded substances without fixed belongings, 
unprotected by ‘their’ states” /…/ “that is, a form of human life upon which the sovereignty of 
states, of ethnic/religious communities and local strongmen can be performed and ‘natured’”41. 
This implies that the state is not the only centre and origin of sovereignty. Rather, the state is 
constantly confronted by other forms of sovereign bodies which attempt to insert control over the 
governed subject. Thus, the very invocation and attempted reassertion of borders, sovereign 
powers, and state apparatuses is evidence of bids for securitisation, not merely on the part of 
majorities, but also minorities. Within Europe, for instance, we have seen how Muslim and other 
minority communities are repeatedly framed in terms of security threats as migration is 
perceived as threatening to the self-identity of the majority society. In return, there is evidence of 
the closing down of available options to many Muslim minority community members. Also in 
Canada there have been attempts to import such a framing of Muslims and other minorities into 
Canadian discourse42 and Canadian popular culture43. This is both reflected and amplified by 
recent regulatory and legal changes adopted by the Conservative government. In this context, the 
thrust of recent policy has been toward a pro-Monarchist, traditionalist and Protestant anglo-
conformism combined with a marked pro-Israeli stance in Canadian foreign policy and a 
hardening of regulations regarding borders and immigration. Despite the underlying continued 
support for positive integration and multiculturalism in Canadian political culture44, it is apparent 
that discourses of securitisation have increasingly come to vie with those of desecuritisation. 
That security is not only about state security was a theme developed early on by the so-
called Copenhagen School (headed by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan) with its focus on societal 
security and securitisation as a discursive practice45. The Copenhagen school thus started a 
process in which security studies began developing a different vocabulary than that of classical 
international relations approaches to security, including a focus on the politics of risk46 and the 
politics of fear47, often described as “an age of anxiety”48; the “governmentality of unease”49, and 
“ontological (in)security”50. Empirically many of these accounts have been related to September 
11 and its aftermath, but they have also been concerned with a more general unease in terms of 
changed mobilities and the crisis of the state. Such contentions have rested on the idea of porous 
border in which governments can no longer control the flow of currencies, labour or 
commodities, information or unwanted aliens. Much of the discourse has focused on the 
unassimilable migrant workers, but it has also been preoccupied with other external threats such 
as the French reaction against US cultural products, the concern that the opening of the Channel 
Tunnel would open England to rabies, that the Euro would threaten the sterling or that legal 
sovereignty would be endangered by European courts51.  Theoretically these concerns have often 
focused on power relations in order to better understand the meaning and construction of borders 
and boundaries.  
The fact that borders are politically constructed means that they have to find their 
legitimacy in boundaries, i.e. the cultural and political narratives about a society, its culture, 
territory and history; about who is member of that society and, consequentially, who is an 
outsider. In this sense, we distinguish between borders, understood as the institutionalized 
phenomena, established in legal texts as territorial and spatio-temporal demarcations and 
boundaries, the narratives constructed to give or challenge the meaning of borders. This 
distinction in often implicit in the literature on borders, where institutional and narrative or 
discursive demarcation of borders is considered to be part of the same process. Instead, we see 
them as separated, albeit interrelated processes52. As narratives, boundaries refer to a description 
of the fundamental events in their natural logical and chronological order53. Through their 
symbolic power they can become part of what Eder54 calls the “hardness of borders” as they help 
to “naturalise” hard borders in the sense of taking borders for granted. Crucially, they have an 
ontological dimension55. Narratives about the boundaries of a community are used by actors to 
make sense of who they are in relation to contrasting out-groups56. A narrative approach to 
boundaries embraces a principle of mind in action, which implies that the construction of 
boundaries is not a passive endeavour, but one in which narratives mediate social practice. Hence 
the notion of narrative engagement is important as it suggests that individuals navigate a 
polyphonic context in which multiple storylines circulate and compete for dominance in 
individual appropriation57. This notion is crucial, as we shall see below, if we are to fully 
appreciate resistance and desecuritising moves. It also complicates some of the contemporary 
readings of security practices and their emphasis on speech acts, top-down governance and 
exceptional politics. In addition it provides a much needed socio-psychological perspective to 
this literature. 
BANAL SECURITISATION – SECURITISING THE EVERYDAY 
Attempts to naturalise borders and define the boundaries of communities may seem to imply 
only purposeful action on behalf of politicians (and/or community leaders) in order to manipulate 
individual and group sentiments to realise political objectives. In this sense it clearly involves the 
development of a state of exception in line with the ideas developed by Agamben and others58, 
including attempts to govern subjectivities and regulate behaviour. However, the securitisation of 
borders is not simply about manipulating and mobilising opinion but also describes the process 
through which individuals and groups struggle to cope with uncertainty and insecurity/ies. This 
mode of powerlessness and anxiety clearly predates September 11, but it has also created a 
foundation for emerging responses to this event, and others like it; as such responses have 
thrived on the sensibility of vulnerability.  
Many of the beliefs that shape the current response to terrorism – the idea that humanity 
faces unprecedented threats, that we inhabit a new era of terror, that we are confronted by a 
new species of terrorist threat, that what we must really fear is the unknown – are the 
product of a cultural imagination that is dominated by a sense of vulnerability59. 
Read in this light, securitising moves are co-constitutive and co-produced rather than just those 
states of exceptions viewed through Agamben’s work as the suspension of the juridical order. On 
the one hand, political elites, public figures, parts of the media and public campaigners have used 
a politics of fear to promote their own agendas. On the other hand, individuals and groups have 
been perceptive to such a politics, due to its splitting function and its constant othering – to use 
Lacanian terminology – involving aspects of banal securitisation60. This conception of security 
departs from the Copenhagen School’s61 insistence on the exceptionality of securitisation, but it 
also differs from Didier Bigo’s62 and others’63 argument that practices of security exist in a 
specific field defined by particular know-how and technologies in which securitisation relies on 
certain security professionals. In contrast to perceptions of securitisation as extraordinary 
responses to particular speech acts or specific governing techniques, we regard this securitisation 
process as also being inherent in the everyday and the mundane – the normalising narratives that 
frame individual responses to fragmentation, threat and identity destabilisation64.  
This involves a search for ontological security which becomes a spatial as well as a 
psychological dynamic to do with a generalized sense of insecurity, danger and threat and the 
longing for secure boundaries. As Noble65 has noted in regard to a post-9/11 world, the 
experience of increasing racism and otherness, “undermine the ability of migrants to feel ‘at 
home’ and hence their capacity to exist as citizens”. In this sense both bordering and boundary 
practices have a psychological dimension. They fulfil an imaginary protection, at times manifest 
in fetishism for “pure” identities, and thus co-constitute the governing of subjectivities and 
behaviour. Any attempts to break this socio-psychological dynamic must take into account not 
only structural securitising moves justified through a politics of exception and fear, but also the 
vulnerabilities that make such a politics possible. If, as Claudia Aradau has argued, 
“securitization orders social relations according to the logic of political realism and 
institutionalizes an exceptionalism of speed, extraordinary measures and friend/enemy”, then 
desecuritisation needs to become a “normative project which reclaims a notion of democratic 
politics where the struggle for emancipation is possible”66. Hence, we must think of 
emancipation in terms of bottom-up approaches allowing for subjectification and re-
appropriation of alternative narratives that can resist and subvert hegemonic dominance. At heart 
is the challenge to sovereign power from those at the margins of knowledge production – the 
return of the political – in the words of Jenny Edkins. “The protests reclaim memory and rewrite 
it as a form of resistance”67. Such resistance is psychological as well as structural, and is 
grounded in an emotional basis of defiance and anger that can reframe hegemonic boundaries. 
One main component of Agamben’s thought is his conception of the subject as an 
interval or remainder between what he refers to as processes of subjectification and de-
subjectification68. If we see the current world order in terms of a state of exception, as a 
suspension of a juridical order, then the task is to make the law ineffective by creating a new 
form of subject that is neither self nor other. Agamben uses the term profanation, meaning to 
violate or transgress, as well as play, as a useful term for a process in which something new is 
created through a novel use of old “things”. The intention is to use the internal logic inherent in a 
state of exception to subvert its outcomes. This new thing can avoid the sovereign capture. 
“(W)hat the state cannot tolerate in any way … is that the singularities form a community, 
without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of 
belonging”69. The issue at stake is thus to explore and invent the profane potential that resides 
within remnant forms of subjectification and de-subjectification produced by sovereign power 
itself70. 
This was recognised by Mikhail Bakhtin71 in his emphasis on dialogism as expressing 
multitudes of multivoiced meanings in which a critical self is emerging. Relying on Bakhtin, 
Elena Marková72 formulates an ontology which places dialogicality, i.e. the capacity of the 
human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social realities, at the centre. At heart is 
to find ways in which to overcome strangeness through recognising the tension inherent in 
exceptional practices and the possibilities this may imply for resisting conformity and 
monological closure. Monological closure refers to the attempts made by a single authority to 
monopolise meaning to the exclusion of all competing voices73. The dialogical encounter, 
notably the profane transgressions of self-dialogism, calls for the preservation of the other within 
the self.  Such an orientation avoids the danger of ethnocentrism and of being locked in either the 
epistemic overpowering of the other, or in historicism, individualisation and the concealment of 
hegemonic power structures and practices.  
In normative terms, it is thus not enough to see movements for political change in terms 
of right-claims or centring such movements on identity politics74. Hence, rather than being 
fabricated from above, resistance and resilience must be manifest in a desecuritisation process 
focused on everyday interactions that question the normalising narrative order of society. This 
requires prizing open any hegemonic narratives, including that of “the West”, as narratives are 
always interlocked with political, economic and cultural conditions of societies and because 
narratives have a strong ontological function at all levels at which they operate75. Addressing 
narrative change is not enough, however, also socio-psychological positioning needs to be taken 
into account promoting, in the words of Henry76, “empowerment and resistance to forms of 
subjugation; the politicization and mobilization of marginalized groups; the transformation of 
social, cultural and economic institutions, and the dismantling of dominant cultural hierarchies, 
structures and systems of representation”. Many young people from different cultural and 
religious backgrounds refuse to be positioned into stereotypic notions of who they are or are 
supposed to be. Instead, they challenge both majority and minority norms and romanticised 
narratives through everyday practices and engagement. Many of these are at the forefront of 
building bridges to the larger political society and work through cultural and religious 
compromises to challenge monological closures of self and identity and unjustified dominance of 
some voices over others.  
To what extent do those at the margins of citizenship resist securitising practices aimed at 
limiting their presence and rights, and how far do they accomplish this without reproducing 
securitising practices that isolate them from other groups. In order to discuss this in the next 
section we outline securitisation in the British and Canadian contexts. In the subsequent section 
we give examples of how far these securitising practices have been resisted..  
GOVERNING SECURITIES: YOUNG MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN AND CANADA 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Prime Minister Thatcher voiced her concerns about the country 
being swamped by people with a different culture.  These were also the years when a number of 
nostalgic Raj movies hit the cinemas together with an emphasis on Victorian values and a 
neoconservative remythication of the imperial past. In the 1980s the Thatcher government 
established a national curriculum in schools to enhance the transmission of a shared national 
identity, where British history should take precedence over world history77. The war nostalgia in 
British society is still prevalent and perpetuates a belief that the British society can only enjoy 
restorative solidarity when it is at war. This nostalgia, Gilroy78 says, seems to have provided the 
backdrop to Tony Blair’s adventures in Iraq and helps to explain why his attachment to the 
politics of George W. Bush was so significant and unshakeable. This war nostalgia goes together 
with an inclination to assume that there is such a thing as a British way of life in which the 
majority sets the rules and makes sure that control remains in the hands of native Britons. Hence 
there are few expectations that immigrants should become good Englishmen, Scotsmen or 
Welshmen. Rather, ethnic communities have become important reference points for public 
authorities and the focus of British multicultural politics has often been on race and ethnic 
relations79. The result has been “multiculturalism on one island” as Adrian Favell80 puts it, where 
immigrant and ethnic minorities have been “nationalised” in relation to British social and 
political institutions. The 1999 Parekh report followed the logic of this race relations politics in 
its recommendation that the major political parties should seek to select ethnic minority 
candidates in seats where more than 25 per cent of the population is from ethnic minorities. As 
pointed out by Geddes81, the corollary of this logic would mean that “white people are best 
represented by other white people”. Underlying this race-related logic is the implication that it is 
the minorities that should be concerned with their own representation rather than there being 
more general modes of representation. In this sense representation becomes a minority concern 
instead of a mainstream issue82. 
In terms of Muslim minority communities, governance in a British context has thus taken 
the form of surveillance of suspect communities – a concept first used in relation to the IRA – in 
which the process of identification of a threat legitimates the politics of exception put in place by 
the state83. This can be exemplified in terms of how extremism, ideology, evil, and Islamism 
became intertwined in the narrative following the attacks in London on July 7, 2005, interspersed 
with the theme of barbarism as a term associated with the metaphorical struggle for civility. In 
the language of Tony Blair, this was evident in the divergence between the “terrorists”, the 
“civilised people” and “those Muslims who represent ‘the decent, humane and principled faith of 
Islam’”84. The feeling that Britain was under attack, that national values and national unity were 
under threat and that people were fearful instigated a response in which the nation would resist 
and stand united. However, similar to September 11, this narrative also provided a foundation for 
closer surveillance of these communities resulting, for instance, in the UK control orders85.  
Events surrounding this event illustrate the particular forms of governance facing British 
Muslims. As forms of governance, they work at the emotional level to construct a normality 
prevailed by fear and anxiety. They contribute towards the feeling that majority populations are 
dealing with the legacies of these traumas through everyday securitisation of the British public 
sphere. Such governance obviously affects those communities under surveillance. In the 2010 
report on suspect communities, the young Muslims interviewed felt the effects of such 
surveillance as they talked of fearfulness, of lying low and keeping their heads down86. After 
September 11 and 7/7 Muslims were pressed to condemn the attacks louder than other citizens as 
anything else would have been considered as hidden support for the murder of innocent civilians. 
Hostility to Muslims also intensified after these tragic events; from abuse and discriminatory 
treatment to physical violence, including assault on individuals, the desecration of graves, and 
attacks on mosques and other Muslim community buildings. Hence it is not surprising that a 
substantial number of British Muslims remain alienated from mainstream British society, 
experiencing a sense of retreatism from the majority community. Muslims in Britain have been 
forced to think of themselves in reaction to being rejected and constructed as the other, as their 
identification with Britishness is often questioned.  
This has at times involved the reproduction of securitising practices on behalf of some 
members of these communities. While the atmosphere of our ten-person Bradford focus group, 
conducted on March 28, 2007, was generally positive, it was interrupted after about 35 minutes 
by a woman who had up to that point been sitting quietly. Her intervention expressed certain 
elements of Islamic literalism that were intended to shut down discourse – or at least to attempt 
to do so. The context for her interruption was a statement made by another woman that Muslims 
need to work harder at knowing their religion as individuals and to practice it before they preach. 
A male in the group was beginning to express his agreement when the woman interjected loudly 
and turned to one of the authors, saying defiantly: “excuse me, but if you have very little 
knowledge about our religion…what our own rights…our relationship towards God – about 
God’s rights that is on us – the more you try to practice your religion, the more they call you a 
fanatic. The more you try to become close to God, the more he will test you and of course that 
will make them mad”. Her tone was declarative to the others in the room as she was attempting 
to establish control and in so doing was laying down categories of belonging, order, and 
propriety. 
The setting for the politics of immigration, integration and securitization in Canada was 
the birth of multiculturalism under the prime ministerships of Pierre Trudeau in the 1970s and 
early 1980s and Brian Mulroney in the 1980s and early 1990s. Grounded in a move away from 
both anglo-conformity and the ‘two solitudes’ of the French and English, the Canadian regime 
began to positively embrace multiculturalism and the polyethnic polity in the 1970s87. The 
principal public policy initiatives that expressed these developments were: The Canada 
Immigration Act that came into effect in 1978 and introduced a highly selective points system 
based upon qualifications, resources, and skills, and at the same opened up immigration to non-
European sources; the Constitution Act of 1982 that recognized and entrenched many of the 
principles of multiculturalism in a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that balanced individual, 
state, and community rights; and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988, that formally 
entrenched the core principles of ethno-cultural diversity, civic equality, and participation. It was 
into this context that the first substantial waves of Muslim immigrants entered Canada. Having 
selected from the more educated and affluent immigrant applicants, the initial setting of 
reception and integration was different from the European setting and more closely aligned to the 
American experience88.  Given this context, it is understandable that the socio-economic, 
cultural, and strategic bases upon which the multiple minorities of Canada have come to 
constitute their political lives together condition a set of responses which as we have noted89 are 
qualitatively different from those of the British interviewees. While instances of defensive 
essentialism and assertive literalism are to be found in both settings, the overall tone of the 
Canadian milieu is more positive and expressive of a habitus of political engagement. In the 
context of its evolving culture and public policy, Canada is widely held to be a postmodern state, 
grounded in a long-standing plurinational and polyethnic diversity. Canada is a fixed address but 
not a singular homeland, and it has never been a colonial power, despite the internal colonialism 
of its aboriginal policies. At various times its citizens have attempted to suture a common and 
unambiguous identity, efforts that have resulted in failure. Canada’s core identity is in fact not to 
have an identity. Since the 1970s large numbers of Muslim and other immigrants have settled in 
Canada on the basis of a competitive points-based immigration system that privileges wealth, 
educational attainment, and occupational category. Such selectiveness has created a Muslim 
minority in Canada that in contrast to its British counterpart is more affluent and better educated. 
While Canada has not been immune from racism and anti-Muslim actions, the selective 
citizenship regime in combination with the emerging sense of national identity have opened 
spaces for a more adequate integration of Muslims than has been possible in most European 
settings.  
As we have already mentioned, however, in a global context of perceived risk and 
danger, both the Canadian regime and the broader culture have experienced increased levels of 
securitisation in recent years. While there have been arrests and detentions in Canada involving 
Muslims, including an aborted terrorist plot, there have so far been no terrorist acts perpetrated 
by Muslims on Canadian soil. Were such actions to take place, the existing discourses and 
narratives of global terror would be likely to accelerate both elite and mass practices of 
securitisation. In the absence of such developments, we have seen very few responses to match 
that of the woman in the Bradford focus group presented above. Much more common among the 
Canadian interviewees and participants is an assertive strategy of political engagement. In our 
focus group conducted in March 2009, we clearly heard instances of reported anti-Muslim words 
and actions, and the challenges of integration, particularly in light of intergenerational and inter-
familial conflict. What was more typical, however, was an assertive and confident politics of 
engagement, punctuated by boundary setting and, in Agamebn’s sense, the playfulness of 
profanation. Typical of the comments was this intervention from one of the women: 
I lived in Mississauga [a suburb of Toronto] so I grew up in a very multicultural society – 
it was like Muslims everywhere and everything like that – but I came to London 
[Ontario] and I think I was the first woman in a hijab to get a part-time job in White Oaks 
Mall [laughs]….and people would constantly come up to me as a cashier…and they said: 
“how did you get this job? What did you do? I mean, how did they treat you?....people 
just assumed they couldn’t apply. 
In her claims, the woman is confidently expressing an engaged and entitled claim to public space 
and to occupy the very centre of community life and public visibility. In so doing, she is also a 
self-defined social animator who gives the message that observant and visible Muslims should 
not be concerned at sharing in the commercial and cultural life that is shared in the banal 
exchanges of Saturday shopping. In so doing, she is urging her fellow Muslims to overcome 
what Lerner refers to as ‘surplus powerlessness’, the learned predisposition to retreat and stay 
quiescent owing to an unrealistic assessment that one’s voice and presence will be ignored, 
belittled, or put down90. She is making the case that a radical desecuritisation of the self and the 
bold claim to a place in integrated and shared public space will be accepted by the majority. 
RESISTING SOVEREIGNTY – DESECURITISATION AS A PRACTICE OF 
RESISTANCE 
The positive and assertive character of mainstream Canadian and British Muslim engagement 
shows that there are organized Muslim voices pushing for greater political involvement. Even 
before September 11, several British Muslim leaders served on the 20-person Runneymede Trust 
Commission that produced Islamophobia: a challenge for us all in October 1997. The 
Commission heard from a diversity of interests including many Muslim organizations and 
individuals. Among other recommendations, the Report promoted a future in which: “the voices 
of British Muslims will be fully heard and held in the same respect as the voices of other 
communities and groups”91. This claim reflects the Bakhtinian notion that dialogical interaction 
is an important component of the politics of resistance. The voice of a Muslim is the voice of a 
unique consciousness and therefore a psychological entity, even as she or he speaks through 
social discourses. Through open access to the ear of the other, the speaker builds meaning in an 
intersubjective space that is dialogically inflected and accented and thereby shapes discourse 
itself. This also puts into focus efforts to redefine narrative relations of past politics. Hopkins and 
Kahani-Hopkins argue that the call to religion and the invocation of the past is neither 
necessarily reactionary nor essentialist and need not necessarily stand in the way of a full and 
effective engagement in the present: “Through the various invocations of the past, contemporary 
Muslims are invited to see themselves in terms of quite different unfolding dramas with quite 
different implications for the characterization of contemporary social relations, their interests and 
their future”92. 
A male student in our Bradford focus group stated that “my experience is that when I 
have got in discussions with non-Muslims, it’s all positive, there’s more scrutiny, but positive 
scrutiny”. There was almost complete agreement among both British and Canadian interviewees 
that Muslims should be encouraged to become more involved in political processes and engage 
as voters, activists and leaders. The general sense of the need for political engagement among the 
British and Canadian interviewees emerged from a powerful sense of contributing to a renewed 
polity that pays attention to Muslim sensibilities. Many of the responses of our interviewees 
expressed a sense of possibility, empowerment and optimism that was nonetheless mixed with a 
certain degree of caution and defensiveness, reflecting an awareness and lived experience of 
boundary setting and the cultural and structural restrictions on access to citizenship. The 
following comments provide an appropriate way to summarise the more general orientations of 
the interviewees: 
I think Muslims should join mainstream political parties….I think non-Muslim British 
society needs them – you know, needs to benefit from their diversity – needs to benefit 
from what they can bring….Through the political system where Muslims raise their 
voices…there’s a likelihood, even though it’s a small likelihood, there’s a likelihood they 
will actually be able to do something….. (British male economist and community leader). 
I am in this very blessed position. I have to help. I don’t know what it’s like to live your 
day-to-day life and not feel like you have this raging passion inside of you to reach out 
and help in some way or another. And to me that’s – that’s picking up the phone and 
calling, you know, Ed Holder’s [local MP] office and saying “Can we talk? When can I 
come in because we need to discuss this?” And you know calling a bunch of other groups 
in the city and a bunch of other groups from out of town and getting representatives, and 
then going as a group and talking about that…. (Canadian female placement worker) 
Facing the common challenges of regimes that are increasingly securitised and whose regimes of 
borders and boundaries have become ever more complex and plurilocational, our Muslim 
interviewees in both Canada and Britain exhibit a range of creative acts of profanation, even at 
times verging on the carnivalesque, as they negotiate an ever-changing world of scale and scope. 
Through almost imperceptible acts of resistance, they navigate themselves and their bodies 
toward a renewed citizenship that is cognizant of the changing landscapes of those regimes that 
configure their worlds. As Salter and Piché93 point out, the regime itself is no monolith and is in 
fact multiply and complexly constituted.  Shotter states: “…no one yet quite knows what it is to 
be a citizen; it is a status which one must struggle to attain in the face of competing version of 
what is proper to struggle for”94. Not all acts of citizenship are rupturings, and the cultivation of 
citizenship in the self involves “wars of position” as well as “wars of manoeuvre”95. Some acts 
of citizenship are gestures, some are massages, others are trial probings or clinical cuttings 
around affected areas. The following selections from our data illustrate the ingenuity of a range 
of bids to desecuritise citizenship and to relocate one’s place through the profane. 
Claiming the metropole/refusing the margins   
To the extent that regimes of citizenship have rebordered western states and securitized them 
through a reassertion of the imagined communities of ethno-racial majorities, assertive Muslim 
minorities have questioned such boundaries, desecuritized their intersubjective worlds and 
problematised nationality.  
A middle-aged male lawyer and politician in Canada of Lebanese background makes reference 
to the cultural consignment of himself and his family to a remote homeland and insists on staking 
a claim in the heart of Canada: 
..I think in this Federal Election, there are more Muslims that have come forward to run 
for office than ever before. We’re part of this community, you know we’re part of this 
community....you know, really it’s a matter of geography. It’s – you know – I mean I was 
born in Lebanon – you know- I have kids that were born in London, Ontario. They’re 
Canadian...when you say to my son ”go back to your own country,” he just sort of looks 
at them like ”What the hell are you talking about? This is my country.” So, you know, 
where one is born is really a matter of geography.  
A very similar claim for location at the centre of things is made by a British female sociology 
student of Pakistani and Caucasian mixed parentage, who is also a hijabi. She says: “People say 
ridiculous things like ‘if they don’t like Britain why don’t they go home? Trouble is for many 
like me Britain is our home”. 
A Canadian male student of mixed background insists on proudly occupying the centre of 
Canadian citizenship discourse with the Muslim body: 
Muslims are commanded to obey the law, even if it is not our own, and be upright 
citizens. This means that Canadian Muslims should ideally be industrious, hardworking, 
and pay all taxes, without any crime rate, alcoholism, domestic abuse, or fraud. In short, 
the potential is that when Muslims are observant of their faith, they are actually the ideal 
citizens for Canada. 
Individuals make claims on the metropole in different ways. Two young Canadian 
women of Palestinian origin, both of whom work as social workers, are political activists, and 
know each other. Despite this, have very different ideas regarding political involvement. One of 
them rejects the apparatus of political parties, elections and formal politics as hypocritical and 
useless. She devotes her energies instead to charitable work in the non-profit sector. Her friend, 
who we quoted earlier, is an enthusiastic participant in electoral politics, an advocate of 
proportional representation, who routinely campaigns and contacts her MP.  
Legal borders vs. Cultural boundaries 
One of the most challenging of circumstances is for young Muslims to know that they have full 
legal entitlement as citizens and yet to experience a social distance from the national cultures that 
they inhabit. In Canada, the social exclusion is subtle. A female social sciences student of 
Eritrean background says: “...Canada claims to be so multicultural and accepting, but under their 
breath, but really when you ask them, they will only accept what they want to accept, for 
instance to food, but not beliefs. I think they’re threatened by our religion”. 
A commonly held complaint among the British students is expressed by a female student in 
Bradford MSA focus group: “You’ve got to understand people saying ‘integrate’ and at the same 
time shutting the doors in your face....” 
A Canadian female lawyer discusses reactions on the part of broader society to Muslim 
Canadians expressing an assertive voice in the public sphere. Her point is very similar to that of 
the British student, arguing effectively that Muslims are criticised if they do not occupy public 
space, but suspected if they actually take the public sphere seriously: 
...it’s not this person is exercising their right, it’s this person is trying to impress upon 
Canadian society their views, trying to take over, trying to undermine Canadian values, 
even though this person is using the political process, is using the means that there are, 
that they are entitled to use. I feel that sometimes it’s viewed with a little more suspicion 
than if they weren’t Muslim. 
The results of these distinctions are to alienate some Muslims. A Canadian woman student of 
Indian origin describes herself as “a citizen of the world”. She reflects: “I don’t think of myself 
as a Canadian. I’m a citizen of Canada but I’m not like descriptively a Canadian citizen, right?”  
A Canadian male student of Iraqi origin, who has only been in Canada for seven years, goes 
further and locates himself in Iraq itself: “I don’t think Canada is my home country. I think the 
place that is being attacked, the place that people are not living peacefully, that should be our 
home country....There is not ‘I am Canadian; he is Iraqi’. We are all human beings at the end of 
the day”. 
Hostility directed against certain Muslims leads some, such as a Canadian-born male student of 
Pakistani origin, to doubt the security of his father’s legal status as a citizen. At any time, he 
believes his father can be displaced. He says: “My father thinks...he’s a visitor here and he’s not 
welcome, and at any moment they can kick him out”. 
Thus, resistance to rebordering practices may take the form of cultural and political voice against 
those who have attempted to instantiate new cultural boundaries. It may also take the form of 
cognitive or literal exit to a more cosmopolitan, or at least better integrated, world.  
Strategic integration and bodily plurilocation 
For those who are gradually experiencing themselves and those they love being displaced into a 
series of external locations – as refugee claimants, smuggled humans, visa applicants, caged 
occupants of remote holding camps, homo sacer, economic migrants or citizens of convenience 
from elsewhere trying to take advantage of “our” generosity, there is a tendency to respond 
through evasion, ambiguity or pluriform existence. A female student of Iraqi background in 
Canada: 
More than ever I think we...need to integrate ourselves. I always say not integrate 
completely because we do have our values and we do have our cultural norms that we 
hold very dear. And not assimilate completely, but also not isolate completely and hold 
ourselves into our own private pockets and not give to Canadians. But have a middle 
ground of integration – kind of a give and take – and not just get involved in political 
issues that affect us as Muslims, but also...we need to get out there and to give to a 
country that has given so much to us....let’s come to a middle ground consensus so that 
we can live as Canadian Muslims.”  
In a written submission, a Canadian male science student expresses surprise in the discovery of 
his own Canadianness through a mapping of values:  “I know of renowned Islamic scholars who 
state that Canada is the most Islamic nation in the world if you look at our laws/const. I 
personally agree with this idea. While we share a lot of Canadian our values (just realized I am 
both!) in practice these are hardly ever interpreted the same way even amongst Canadians”. A 
Canadian male teacher of Lebanese origins is asked by one of his students why she is not 
allowed to eat pork, even though the Canadians are allowed: “..I go ‘what are you?’ She goes 
‘I’m Muslim’. I go ‘Right, where were you born?’ She goes: ‘I was born in London’. I go 
‘London is in Canada, so you’re not Canadian?’” His response is to use radical pedagogy to 
invite his student to occupy the ground in which she is located, to make it home.  
In each of these instances, there is active resistance to banal securitisation. In both a psychic and 
a somatic sense, these Muslims are playing with their spatio-temporal locales in a bid to craft 
subjects that refuse the dualism of ‘self and other’, either through being both or being neither. 
Conclusions 
In the context of a global order in which state sovereignty is increasingly in question and a 
complex of socio-economic and political networks and flows are reconfiguring both phenomenal 
space and the (b)ordering of regimes, different kinds of postnational strategies of citizenship 
have emerged that do not necessarily take their point of departure from cosmopolitan human 
rights discourses or communal rights claims. Reflecting possibility and opportunity, a series of 
translocational citizenships is now possible. Punctuated by traumatic events, the global order of 
vertiginous change has also conditioned responses of panic, fear, uncertainty, and perceptions of 
risk. The reactionary consequences of this are evident in the erecting of neo-nationalist 
boundaries, ethno-cultural particularisms, and the centrifugal scatterings of borders through new 
regimes of surveillance and securitisation.  
Multiculturalism has not fared well under such circumstances of securitisation, and there 
has been a generalised closing down of communication and contact between and among those 
perceived to belong to distinctive ethno-cultural communities. On the basis of a widespread 
intolerance of ambiguity and an insistence on categorical and essentialist forms of social 
inclusion and exclusion, anti-terrorist discourses and anti-Muslim sentiments have contributed to 
the securitisation of Europe, not as a fortress, but as an evolving organic regime whose 
capillaries and sinews are being constantly repositioned to respond to perceived threat, both 
within Europe and beyond. Such are the moving parts of what Bigo refers to as banopticisation. 
Given the global order, such exclusionary tendencies are evident even in Canada, where the 
history of colonisation, citizenship regime, and multicultural presence has been distinct.  
Those who live within the cracks of the securitised order, who are designated other and 
outsider, or the enemy within, find themselves dislocated by the reconfigurations of borders that 
take place as regimes respond to uncertainty and threat. Through the agency of the dialogical self 
and profane acts of resistance, young Muslims demonstrate a capability to engage citizenship 
regimes in various ways, to adapt and to challenge through assertive remappings of social space. 
Assertiveness through positive engagement entails working within evolving multicultures (for no 
matter elite claims that multiculturalism is a failure, multiculture is a lived reality) to dislocate, 
relocate, and plurilocate Muslim bodies in the face of regimes of (b)ordering that reconfigure 
disciplinary space and place. Building on the conviviality of dialogical interactions as well as the 
insistence of Muslim bodies in the public arena, banal acts of citizenship contribute to a 
remapping of the social landscape. So too do the profane refusals to colour within the lines that 
are constantly redrawn by securitised citizenship regimes and the insistence on creative 
ambiguity and multiplicity in the face of bureaucratic taxonomy and cultural endogamy. 
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